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Abstract 
 
This article examines changes to the National Assembly for Wales committees and how they act               
as markers that help explain the dynamics of a significant and contemporaneous constitutional             
journey. It uses as its backdrop recent constitutional and political change in the UK, particularly               
that initiated by devolution. Uniquely, we draw upon management theory as well as political              
science to explain why changes in the focus, identity and profile of Assembly committees              
represent significant ​markers ​or ​reflectors of constitutional shifts. We suggest that examining            
key components within the internal architecture of parliaments at different stages of development             
offers an additional and complementary level of institutional analysis. Our review of the             
Assembly committees reveals that they have reflected the pace and shape of change in Welsh               
devolution, and that shifts in their profile and operation offer another insight into devolution,              
whilst also reflecting wider institutional and political change.  
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CHRONICLING NATIONAL ASSEMBLY COMMITTEES AS MARKERS 
OF INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE  
 
Introduction 
Renewed interest in the operation and modernisation of parliaments, set alongside the current             
unprecedentedly fluid constitutional politics in the United Kingdom, provides an opportunity to            
consider alternative ways of chronicling institutional change within parliamentary settings and of            
assessing the role of parliamentary committees in absorbing and reflecting constitutional           
dynamics. This article explores the role of key components within the internal architecture of the               
National Assembly for Wales [Assembly], one of UK’s devolved legislatures, in mapping and             
marking some significant chapters in its institutional development, a journey that has been             
precipitated by a heavy constitutional flux since 1999 when the Assembly was established. 
 
Much of the literature around constitutional change explores challenges in reconciling customary            
constitutional principles - parliamentary sovereignty, in particular - with the practice, politics and             
judicial implications of devolution and Europeanisation (Gifford 2010; Carter, 2013; Elcock and            
Keating, 2013; Bradbury and Mawson 2014; Elliott 2015). The redefinition of the            
citizen-parliament proxy has also attracted some interest in the context of reconnecting citizens             
with the political process (Leston-Bandeira 2012, 2016), and the use of referenda for dealing              
with constitutional issues (Curtice 2013; Laycock 2013). Yet, how parliamentary institutions           
specifically absorb these high level constitutional shifts internally has been less explored. 
 
The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution modelled its own definition of the               
constitution as: ‘the set of laws, rules and practices that create the basic institutions of the state,                 
and its component and related parts, and stipulate the powers of those institutions and the               
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relationship between the different institutions and between those institutions and the individual’            
(House of Lords, 2001/2). From a territorial perspective, constitutional change in Wales includes             
any transformation or adaptation of the constituent framework supporting the post 1999 polity:             
devolved powers and competencies, power structures, the relationships between them, the           
citizen-Assembly link. We use this as a mechanism fo​r distinguishing between institutional and             
constitutional change and for determining where institutional change instigates constitutional          
shifts and vice versa, when constitutional shifts lead to dramatic institutional reconfiguration. 
 
Given the UK predilection for outsourcing constitutional deliberation to independent or Royal            
Commissions (McAllister 2005, McAllister and Stirbu 2008), the literature (in the UK) focusing             
on the specific contributions made by parliamentary committees to institutionalising and           
stimulating constitutional change is rather scarce, as the focus lies predominantly on their             
pre-legislative and legislative scrutiny roles. Analysis of institutional modernisation at          
Westminster, focused on strengthening select committees’ effectiveness vis a vis scrutiny,           
legislative efficiency, and policy contribution is extremely useful (Norton 2000; Flinders 2002;            
Brazier et al 2005; Russell 2011). Griffiths and Evans (2013) offer some insight into the               
Commons Welsh Affairs Select Committee’s role in constitutional development and in           
devolving of further powers to Wales. Outside Westminster, analysis of Scottish, Welsh and             
Northern Irish committees is limited to studies of operation, participative nature, scrutiny            
capacity and policy influence (see Arter 2004, 2006; Cairney 2006; McAllister and Stirbu 2007,              
McLaverty and McLeod 2012; Cole 2014; Cole and McAllister 2015). Stirbu (2009) ​explores             
how constitutional dynamics in Wales have shaped the institutional development of the National             
Assembly and opens the debate around the extent to which institutional change itself precipitated              
constitutional shifts in Wales.  
 
More broadly, the rich body of literature linking parliamentary modernisation to strengthening            
committee systems tends to focus mostly on legislation or oversight committees, ignoring other             
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types (i.e. ad-hoc, procedures, finance) (see Longley eds. 1994; Dorring ed. 1995; Longley and              
Agh eds. 1997; Longley 2012). Most functionalist studies develop useful comparators of            
parliamentary practice, measures of strength, influence, and committee cohesion (Hazan 2003),           
yet, they tend to assume a high degree of institutional maturity and optimality (Strom 1998). This                
seems questionable in the case of small or newly established institutions - such as the National                
Assembly -, where size is an important constraining factor.  
 
Similarly, new institutionalists’ concern with legislative organisation (Mattsom and Strom 1995)           
places committee systems at the heart of parliamentary deliberative or legislative processes            
(Dorring 2001; Pollack 2003; Arter, 2006), yet the agency perspective underpinning such            
approaches gives prominence to political parties as the principal form of parliamentary            
organisation, whilst regarding committees as mere extensions of political parties (Damgaard           
1995; Kim and Loewenberg 2005) - a significant limitation in our opinion. Studies of              
committees’ cohesion, autonomy and counterweighting government party domination (Drewry         
1985; Kelly 2013) can offer better balance.  
 
Our study addresses the existing gaps and limitations of the scholarship to date by 1) expanding                
analysis to a broader range of committees, some with administrative or internal corporate             
governance roles and which, we argue, are equally critical in shaping our understanding of how               
institutions behave in changing constitutional contexts; and 2) by chronicling committees’           
contributions to institution building using a holistic and more forensic analysis of the             
institutionalisation process. Our case study on the Assembly committees is justified by the fact              
that Wales has experienced a steady accrual of powers and a rapidly shifting constitutional              
terrain since devolution, reflected in its internal architecture and operation over the last 20 years.               
Naturally, this has had a direct effect on its committee system, seen as the “engine room” and the                  
“heartbeat” of the Assembly. Therefore, the Assembly’s institutional journey provides fruitful           
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terrain to test our central contention that committees are valuable reflectors that mark the change               
process.  
 
The objectives of this article are four fold. First, we chronicle the evolution of the Assembly’s                
committee system, mapping it across the four stages in Wales’s constitutional settlement to date.              
Second, we investigate how the committee system has encapsulated devolution’s most prominent            
rhetoric - that of closer engagement with the citizens. Third, we consider committees’ usefulness              
in understanding Wales’s constitutional development by exploring the extent to which           
constitutional affairs and procedural change have been embedded in permanent structures and            
processes within the Assembly. Finally, we investigate the extent to which the committee system              
has matured and achieved stable patterns of organisation, behaviour, and autonomy.  
 
Our rationale for focusing on parliamentary committees’ specific contribution to          
institution-building has been stimulated on the one hand by the significant constitutional flux in              
the UK and, on the other hand, by the way in which shifts in the internal architecture of                  
parliamentary institutions act as levers for better understanding wider change. Furthermore, the            
devolution of power within the UK has reignited interest in different parliamentary structures             
that operate adjacently. Given the Assembly committees’ propensity to absorb and engineer            
change, we were encouraged to adopt a more holistic approach to understanding institutional             
change, especially when this is prompted by rapid constitutional shifts. The subsidiary value of              
this is that it also generates renewed analysis of committee systems themselves that extends              
beyond their traditional functions in legislative scrutiny and oversight of government. 
 
Approach 
 
The article draws out specific evidence from over 12 years’ research by the authors on               
devolution in Wales that explored key aspects of the Assembly’s development as a parliamentary              
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institution. Within this, a wide range of ethnographic and documentary methods has been             
employed to investigate institutional shifts. Between 2004 and 2016, we conducted over 100             
interviews with politicians, senior officials and staff, and constitutional experts. We have also             
conducted a focus group with subject committee clerks exploring lessons from early            
experimentation with public engagement. Further participant observation between 2006 and          
2011 provided unique insight into how the Assembly managed the transition from a corporate              
body to a parliamentary structure. We also draw on direct and active participation in some of the                 
Assembly’s major institutional transformations in advisory capacities through expert groups,          
panels and commissions. Supporting this is documentary research including extensive analysis of            
committees’ operational documents (minutes, agendas, reports).  
 
The specific theoretical approach we adopt is important as it blends elements of political theory               
with management analysis to create a unique framework within which to evaluate the Assembly              
committees’ overall contribution to institutional development. Drawing on institutional theory,          
our starting assumption is that new political institutions exhibit an inherent volatility at both              
structural and operational level (Huntington 2006). Our interest is in exploring and            
understanding the processes by which new institutions become stable, valued and predictable.            
The measure of parliamentary institutionalisation is given by the level of functional and             
organisational differentiation of the committee system from the wider political environment and            
the extent to which committee practice becomes established and predictable (Olson and            
Crowther 2002).  
 
We were guided by a vast body of literature focused on the institutionalisation of parliaments               
(Paterson and Copeland 1994; Norton 1998), especially from the perspective of regime change in              
Eastern Europe (Agh, 1998; Olson and Crowther 2002). This is particularly helpful because it              
accounts for highly dynamic constitutional contexts. The UK’s devolved legislatures featured a            
significant degree of institutional volatility in their early years. They arguably had less             
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institutional legacy than the transitional legislatures in Eastern Europe and benefited from a             
relative blank-slate which permits certain experimentation to take place (McAllister and Stirbu            
2007a and b). However, just as within the new democratic legislatures in Eastern Europe,              
committees are nested within parliaments and contribute to their development and maturing            
process (Olson and Crowther 2002). 
 
Devolution, although evidently not as dramatic a transition as from an oppressive regime to a               
democratic one, does challenge at least some of the tenets of the UK constitution (House of                
Lords, 2011) by creating a multilevel system of governance: from centrist to more decentralised              
policy-making, from a majoritarian politics to a more pluralist one (McAllister and Kay 2010)              
and from an elitist to a more participatory and inclusive political culture. In the UK, these were                 
articulated as the very goals of devolution -a process designed to close the gap between               
government and the people. 
 
Then, borrowing from management theory, we draw upon approaches that focus on the strategic              
positioning of organisations within their wider industry for the purpose of gaining competitive             
advantage (Porter 1996), in other words exploring organisations’ strategic fit within their broad             
environments (societal, sectoral, organisational). The establishment and development of political          
institutions also raises questions around the logic and appropriateness of institutional design and             
change (Olsen and March 2004) and, in so far as competitive advantage needs conceptual              
realignment, there is a strong case for parliaments considering positioning strategies within ever             
complex, multilevel systems, where public profile and trust, for instance, are crucial to             
legitimacy, and their bargaining power is essential for effective scrutiny.  
 
We explore new ground by employing a different interpretation of the Aston Matrix (Table 1), a                
management tool developed as a positioning and sense making device that helps organisations             
scan their near and far environments and make sense of factors impacting them (Brown and               
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Osbourne 2012). Management analysis is generally concerned with future trends. However, in            
this article, we adopt a more retrospective approach. The validity of the Aston Matrix, as applied                
here, is that it allows us to analyse committees’ contributions at multiple levels: societal,              
constitutional and organisation level, by identifying some of the most important determinant of             
change, at each level, along their institutional journey.  
 
Given the level of political and administrative flux around Welsh devolution, it was important              
that we took an expansive approach to committees, by including subject, standing as well as               
ad-hoc committees, and explore their role in the management, administration and repeated            
reconfiguration of the institution, a contribution that, to date, has remained largely            
undocumented in academic studies and only loosely conceptualised in theory. 
 
Management literature uses a traditional, yet limiting classification of the determinants of            
change: political, social, economic, and technological trends, usually. However, we regard           
institutional change as extremely complex and we are interested in identifying the strongest             
proxy through which change is channelled at each level.  
 
Devolution stimulated deep transformations at every level in the Assembly’s environment. At            
societal (meta) level, we position committees, as our principal focus of analysis, within the new               
deliberative space created by devolution. Public engagement, encompassing anything from          
outreach, informing, and involving the public, to maintaining an outward-looking and visible            
public profile, is identified early as the main proxy through which the Assembly has both               
absorbed and sought to deliver upon the devolution rhetoric, and established itself as a legitimate               
actor representing the people of Wales. This legitimacy is somewhat fragile however, as             
discussed by Scully and Wyn Jones (2015). We examine committees’ roles in institutionalising             
the relationship between the public and the Assembly and document the evolution of             
mechanisms for engagement, assessing the extent to which these have become standardised.  
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At sectoral (macro) level, we identify institutional development, especially of constitutional           
significance, as the proxy for examining to what extent the Assembly has acquired value,              
predictability and resilience in the face of political change. We focus on investigating             
committees’ contributions to informing some of the wider constitutional debates around the            
Assembly’s structure and status. At micro (organisational) level, we focus on the stability and              
predictability of the committee system as a whole, and in particular on committees’ autonomy              
and scrutiny capacity.  
 
 
Table 1 - The Aston Matrix:  
Level  Meta Macro Micro 
Dominant Factors 
stimulating institution 
building 
Public engagement   
 Constitutional affairs  
  Committee system 
institutionalisation 
 
 
Positioning these elements on the three distinctive levels of the Aston Matrix that incorporate the               
Assembly’s near and far environments helps gauge the committees’ fullest contributions to            
constitutional and organisational change and to the wider democratic process in Wales.            
Furthermore, this helps test the solidification and maturing of organisational practice within the             
institution.  
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Assembly committees and constitutional arrangements 
 
The Assembly’s relatively short existence (currently half way into its fifth term) can be              
punctuated by three institutional interregnums, distinguished as follows: the corporate body           
period (1999-2007) under the constitutive Government of Wales Act 1998; the interim            
constitution period (2007-2011) under the Government of Wales Act 2006; the primary            
(conferred) powers period, following the 2011 referendum . 1
 
Table 2 - The evolution of the Assembly committee system 
 1st Assembly 2nd Assembly 3rd Assembly 4th Assembly 
Stage corporate body interim constitution primary powers 
Committee system 
(number of 
committees) 
Subject Committees (7) 
 Regional Committee (4) 
Standing Committees (7) 
Ad-hoc (2) - 20  
 Subject Committees (5) 
 Regional Committee (7) 
Standing Committees (7) 
Ad-hoc (13/14) - 32 
Legislation Committees (5) 
Scrutiny Committees (6) 
Other /Standing Committees (9) 
Other / Non-permanent (2) - 22 
Scrutiny Committees (5) 
Other / Standing (6) 
Other  Non-Permanent (2) 
Total: 13 
Scrutiny / 
Legislation roles 
Dual role Subject Committees: Policy development 
scrutiny of government side 
Consider secondary legislation 
Separate:  
Legislation Committees: consider 
LCO and Assembly Measures 
Subject based Committees: 
scrutinise government 
Dual role Subject Committees 
consider legislation, scrutinise 
government 
Prescription  
High: type (Subject, Regional, Audit, Secondary 
Legislation) 
Membership and size: strict (d’Hondt) + ministerial 
membership in Subject Committees 
Relaxed: Standing Order to decide committee structure 
Prescribed: Audit 
Committee size Prescribed: 8-11 across all (except ad-hoc-5) 
Flexible: from 4 to 10 
 
Committee 
Portfolios 
mirror executive portfolios cross cutting 
Legislative Initiative only policy development can initiate legislation 
 
1 ​A fourth stage - based on a reserved powers model - has emerged following the Wales Acts 2014 and 
2017​.  
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Under the corporate body model (GoWA 1998, S.1 ss.2), the Assembly committees reflected to              
an extent, both the constitutional limitations of Welsh devolution and the grand aspirations in              
relation to inclusiveness. There were some unusual prescriptions on committees number, types,            
and membership rules. The most significant of these was that the executive secretary (later              
known as ‘minister’) be a member of the subject committee reviewing their relevant portfolio              
(GoWA 1998, S. 57 ss. 4). This brought obvious benefits around information sharing across the               
committee, but attracted heavy criticism for hindering the development of a stronger scrutiny             
culture (Richard Commission 2004; McAllister and Stirbu 2007a) 
 
The interim constitution stage, framed by the Government of Wales Act 2006, marks the formal               
separation of executive and enhanced legislative functions of the Assembly, and signalled a             
move to a less prescriptive framework with regards to the Assembly’s internal organisation             
(GoWA 2006, s.28 & 29). However, legislative powers were only granted in two stages. In the                
interim stage, powers were enhanced by Assembly Measures in competence areas (Schedule 5             2
of GoWA 2006, S.95) and by possibly amending Schedule 5 via Legislative Competence Orders              
(LCO), which required the approval of the Assembly and of both Houses of Parliament. A               
significant re-configuration of the committee system occurred, separating legislation and scrutiny           
roles of committees. Legislation committees were initially set-up as ad-hoc, along the lines of              
Westminster public bill committees, and later replaced by five permanent legislation committees,            
with no particular thematic specialisation, other than one being exclusively dedicated to            
members’ proposed legislation.  
 
The next stage, enshrined in Part IV of the 2006 Act, set out the steps towards full primary                  
legislative powers in fields of devolved competence, conditional on support in a referendum. The              
referendum in March 2011 saw 65.35% vote in favour of the move. Since 2011, the Assembly’s                
powers, structure and operations define it as a parliamentary body, on similar footing with the               
2 Similar to Acts of Parliament  
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other UK devolved legislatures. The more streamlined legislative process and a more strategic             
organisational environment following the establishment of the Assembly Commission, created          
radically different conditions for the committee system aspiring to promote a connected approach             
to legislation and scrutiny (Assembly Commission 2013). The cross cutting committee portfolios            
were carried over and expanded, and legislative duties were once again blended in with scrutiny,               
resulting in five committees covering both policy and legislation alongside a series of other              
relatively well-established standing committees, some of which with important institutional          
legacy (i.e. Business, Public Accounts or Standard of Conduct).  
 
Aston Matrix applied 
Meta-level: Committees’ public engagement 
 
Our analysis started by assessing committees’ contributions to institutionalising public          
engagement through the ‘parent’ organisation. We reviewed formal consultation mechanisms          
(oral and written evidence gathering) as well as informal engagement practices (direct            
engagement with stakeholders via informal meetings, focus and reference groups, outreach via            
off site visits, surveys, rapporteurs) and ICT facilitated engagement (online discussion forums,            
social media use, video engagement). These initiatives help expose the qualitative and            
quantitative relationship between the Assembly and the public, which is integral to the             
devolution project given the original goals around inclusiveness, openness, and democratic           
renewal (against a backdrop of perceived limited legitimacy given the 1997 Referendum saw just              
50.3% of voters support the establishment of an Assembly). 
 
As criteria for institutionalisation, Olson and Crowther (2002) single out organisational and            
functional differentiation from the environment, and the use of universalistic rather particularistic            
standards. Organisational and functional differentiation refers to the existence of distinctive           
institutional structures, process and resources channelled towards supporting, in our case, the            
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Assembly’s engagement practices. The evolution of the Welsh committee system shows           
evidence of all three criteria being met (or partially met) in terms of entrenching public               
engagement into committee operation in a stable and predictable way.  
 
We distinguish two stages here. The first appears counterintuitive and is underpinned by features              
of the original corporate body, namely a lack of clear legislative focus which allowed              
committees to experiment with policy development instead, and a lack of overarching corporate             
strategy, which meant committees developed their own ways of direct engagement with            
stakeholders and the public. Most of this experimentation was dominated by informal practices             
and by particularistic rather than universal standards.  
 
In one focus group , subject committee clerks highlighted the limited formalisation and            3
standardisation of public consultations during the first two terms. The relative informality of             
engagement mechanisms, allegedly facilitating smoother access to committees - as one chief            
executive of a prominent civil society organisation mentioned - comes more from the lack of               
institutional and procedural precedent, rather than from a calculated attempt to innovate.            
Committee clerks considered that to some extent these limitations actually worked to the             
Assembly’s benefit in the process of institutional learning, as a number of engagement             
mechanisms were established and tested: formal consultation exercises, reference groups, off-site           
visits, rapporteurs. Nonetheless, the frenzy of consultation initiated by Assembly committees as            
well as by the government side arguably left the Welsh civic society drained and fatigued               
(Chaney and Fevre, 2001; Day 2006). Questions about the depth of consultation exercises in the               
early years of the Assembly led to attempts to diversify mechanisms to reach out to the general                 
public more widely. Yet, as the participants in our focus group reveal, some of the more                
expansive engagement exercises in the second term struggled, at times, with the overall quality              
of the evidence gathered. 
3 Conducted in 2006  
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The second stage took place within the more strategically-oriented institutional climate post 2007             
under the Assembly Commission’s leadership, which put public engagement and engagement           
with young people at the heart of its first comprehensive strategies (Assembly Commission 2007,              
2011) and changed the organisation and management of the committee support services            
(Assembly Commission, 2013).  
 
At committee level, the citizen-Assembly link has been enhanced by the introduction of the              
petitions process , and the establishment of a Petitions Committee. As one of the most common               4
forms of political engagement of the last few decades (Hansard Society 2010), yet clearly not a                
panacea for successfully effecting political or policy change (Hough 2012), the Assembly’s            
petitions system is, nonetheless, evidence of organisational and functional differentiation of           
Assembly’s engagement role.  
 
The petition system followed the more established and advanced Scottish Parliament petitions            
substantive model, making it easily accessible to the public and, through visible presence and              
outreach, encouraging citizens to engage. The Assembly Petitions Committee can solicit action            
from relevant government Ministers, conduct its own inquiries, or refer the matter to other              
committees, whilst continuing to monitor progress. There is some evidence that petitioning has             
been actively pursued by the Welsh public, with more than 700 petitions received by February               
2017, out of which 311 were completed. Assessing the real and direct impact of petitioning               
beyond entrenching the citizen-Assembly relationship is problematic and beyond the scope of            
our work. However, we are interested in the institutional nestedness of the petition system within               
the Assembly. The 2016 review of the petition system ​suggests that, whilst certain reforms are               
necessary to improve accessibility and overall impact of petitioning (Petitions Committee 2016),            
the system has achieved a certain degree of stability and predictability.  
4 paper petitions in 2007 and e-petitions in 2008  
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Outside the petitions system, committees have formalised and standardised the consultation           
processes within their policy inquiry work. This follows a familiar template: committees issue             
consultation letters; individuals, groups and organisations respond; committees invite oral          
evidence from witnesses and experts; deliberation and reports are published. Since 2007, all             
committees -without exception- have followed this pattern proving that ‘consultation’ has           
become a universal standard of formal engagement. There are of course variations in the scope of                
consultations, as our data from the fourth term illustrates. 
 
Figure 1 - Committee Public Engagement in Policy Enquiries in the 4th Assembly- to replace               
existing figure  
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Qualitative improvements in the process include better referencing of the evidence received,            
alongside with full publication of the responses and of evidence sessions recordings. Some of our               
interviews in 2015/16 suggested this was partly attributed to feedback from organisations that             
saw little acknowledgement and ‘influence’ of their contributions. Rumbul (2016) challenges the            
representativeness of this formal engagement process pointing to the disproportionately low           
number of women appearing in front of committees in oral evidence sessions.  
 
Beyond this formal engagement with the usual suspects -civil society organisations, local            
authorities, business and individual experts- committee clerking and support teams have sought            
to reach out to the broader public. Enhancing informal as well as online engagement has been                
one of the strategies pursued in the third and fourth terms. Our interviews reveal that the type of                  
policy inquiry (follow ups, snap scrutiny of government policy, broader reviews) will however             
determine the scale and nature of the engagement. This may explain variations in the way               
committees seek to engage the public outside the formal call for evidence and witnesses. Another               
explanation, as some of our interviewees point, is the variable level of enthusiasm at the level of                 
the committee chair and clerking team. 
 
The integration and co-location of support services for committees (clerking, research, legal            
advice, communication and outreach) in the fourth term (Assembly Commission 2013) created            
the conditions for further customisation and diversification of direct and indirect engagement,            
especially with regards to surveys, facilitating focus groups on given themes, creating and             
mediating online discussion forums and producing video engagement tools, feeding back into the             
committees’ inquiry work. The advanced use of information and communication technology           
(webcasting and video engagement) enhanced accessibility to committees of remote witnesses           
and of the general public in general. This suggests that committees internalised some of the               
devolution rhetoric by entrenching accessibility and transparency in their day-to-day operation. 
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Our analysis reveals a conscious effort made by committees towards a qualitative (i.e. avoiding              
anecdotal evidence, reaching out beyond the usual suspects) and quantitative (i.e. diversifying            
channels and mechanisms of engagement) improvement of the citizen-Assembly relationship.          
This process, at first informal, unidirectional, lacking standardisation and clarity of purpose,            
gradually matured in the third and fourth terms, whilst also being incorporated at strategic level.               
An important shift has been clarifying the purpose public engagement serves at institutional and              
committee level (Assembly Commission 2011, 2013).  
 
The evidence presented here points to a higher degree of functional and organisational             
differentiation of public engagement within the committees system. This has been achieved first             
by means of the Petitions Committee, a structure that shows elements of stability and continuity,               
and second by the Assembly Commission’s contribution to embedding public engagement within            
institutional strategy. 
 
Macro-level: Committees as agents of organisational change and reflectors of constitutional           
change  
 
The next level of analysis explores Assembly’s positioning within the devolved constitutional            
context. We identified the institutionalisation of constitutional affairs and procedural change as            
the main proxy by which the Assembly evolved from a limited corporate body structure towards               
an established UK legislature. By constitutional affairs, we mean anything from influence over,             
or decision upon, the Assembly’s internal operation and structure, scrutiny of external            
constitutional decisions impacting on Wales, triggering and shaping constitutional deliberations.          
We take the view that some institutional changes within the Assembly have constitutional             
significance and so treat them as such. 
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Constitutional debate intensified with the publication of the ​Better Governance for Wales White             
Paper 2005, and the subsequent Government of Wales Bill 2006, which proposed the formal              
separation between the executive and legislative arms of the Assembly - one of the landmarks of                
in Wales’ constitutional development. By the time the separation process was launched (end of              
2015), there had been limited institutionalisation of constitutional affairs within the Assembly,            
bar from the Welsh Assembly Government’s own constitutional affairs unit, itself a            
non-permanent feature.  
 
The process preparing the grounds for the administrative, political and legal separation was             
operationalised by a series of ad hoc committees. In May 2006, in response to provisions in the                 
Government of Wales Bill, the Assembly established a shadow Commission to plan for the              
Assembly’s future and to oversee the final stages of administrative separation between the             
parliamentary and executive branches (Stirbu 2009). The Shadow Commission conducted          
significant work in relation to repositioning the Assembly (as a legislature) within the Welsh              
polity, with a separate identity from the (then) Welsh Assembly Government. During the same              
period (2006-2007), the Committee on the Standing Orders, another ad-hoc structure, designed            
the new internal procedures for the post-corporate body Assembly, thus redefining the power             
dynamics within the Welsh constitutional system.  
 
The legislative-executive relationship represents an important source of institutionalisation and          
institutional autonomy of parliaments around the world (Olson and Crowther 2002) since it is              
normally indicative of institutional maturity (Norton 1998; Olson and Crowther 2002). Yet,            
existing scholarship is mostly silent on hybrid - that is, blurred lines between legislative and               
executive functions - and emerging institutions (like the Assembly) that operate within extremely             
fluid constitutional contexts and experience gradual accrual of powers. The Assembly’s           
constitutional journey is to some degree one of normalising this relationship, first within the              
context of the corporate body and, later, set against separation and enhanced legislative powers.              
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The Assembly committee system’s evolution has reflected this journey to a great extent, from              
subtle, yet powerful changes in the way committees separated meeting in scrutiny and policy              
mode during the corporate body, to the reconfiguration of committees along broad cross cutting              
themes rather than mirroring ministerial portfolios.  
 
Institutionalisation is a process that requires time, consolidation of practice, dissemination of            
values and continuity of structures (Patterson and Copeland 1994). Whereas the Shadow            
Commission represented a first instance of strategic corporate leadership shaping the Assembly’s            
constitutional vision, the Committee on Standing Orders created the first real platform for the              
Assembly to design its internal structure and operations, thus signalling a qualitative move from              
implementation of constitutional provisions to principal agent of change. This is further            
evidenced by the establishment of other ad-hoc committees that scrutinised constitutional and            
legislative proposals affecting Wales: the Committee on the Better Governance for Wales White             
Paper (in 2005), and the Committee on the Government of Wales Bill (in 2006). Nonetheless,               
despite some evidence of functional differentiation, these were ad-hoc, temporary structures. 
 
Post 2007, we note a more rapid pace in embedding constitutional affairs and procedural change               
within permanent structures in the committee system. For instance, revising the internal            
procedures became the responsibility of the Business Committee, a permanent and influential            
structure in the Assembly, benefitting from a relatively stable membership. The Constitutional            
Affairs Committee , established in the third term, is another permanent structure, built on the              5
legacy of the former (secondary) Legislation Committee that has seen its portfolio enhanced to              
scrutinising constitutional issues arising from the fluid nature of devolution in Wales. The             
Committee's work on the pre-legislative scrutiny of the Draft Wales Bill in 2015, alongside that               
of the Welsh Affairs Select Committee’s at Westminster, was critical in ensuring the Secretary of               
5 Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee in the 5th term 
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State for Wales reconsidered its approach to shaping Wales’ next constitutional settlement and             
addressed a series of major concerns raised in the process (BBC News, 29 February 2016).  
 
Similarly, the Assembly Commission became the main forum for strategic corporate thinking            
and forward planning, and continues to play an important role in the process of resource               
allocation (Assembly Commission 2013) and in ensuring the Assembly’s strategic fit within the             
changing constitutional context (Assembly Commission, 2015). The Presiding Officer recently          
undertook forward planning around anticipated changes from the Wales Act 2017, and            
significantly, has led proposals for reform of the electoral system, the size and capacity of the                
Assembly and Votes at 16, in the light of the devolution of electoral matters to the Assembly                 
(National Assembly for Wales, 1 February 2017). 
 
The evidence presented here points to significant shifts in the way the Assembly has positioned               
itself within the constitutional arena. We notice the more established and standardised manner             
for responding to constitutional change in the third, fourth and fifth terms, as opposed to the less                 
institutionalised way in which the Assembly operated prior to 2007.  
 
Micro-level:  Organisational stability, continuity and autonomy 
 
At micro-level, we focus on the maturing of committees from an organisational perspective. We              
are especially interested in the evolution of structural attributes of the committee system, such as               
number, size, permanence of committees, and membership characteristics (incumbency,         
turnover) across the four terms, thus exposing the degree of stability and continuity. The extent               
to which the committee system achieved a relative autonomy from the rest of the Assembly is                
also relevant. 
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The committee model remained largely unchanged in the first two terms in terms of number,               
type, size of committees and their relationship with the rest of the Assembly. The only structural                
volatility is the number of ad-hoc committees established, a stark contrast between two in the               
first term, and ten in the second. This was largely accounted for the institutional response to a                 
heavy constitutional flux generated by the re-election of a Labour Government and its Welsh              
devolution plans , and to more intense legislative activity concerning Wales at Westminster,            6
which required scrutiny from the Assembly. The relative stability of the corporate body             
committee model should be attributed more to the constraining legislative framework than to             
anything else.  
 
The number of committees was drastically streamlined, from 32 in second term to 12 in the                
fourth term. Membership and size rules themselves changed from being strict and prescribed             7
(see Table 2) during the corporate body, to allowing more flexibility in the fourth term. In the                 
context of the small Assembly size (60 members), the number of committees and their              
membership is critical, giving the strain on individual Members’ workload. Multiple           
memberships in committees has been one of the hindrances to effective scrutiny in the first term                
(McAllister and Stirbu 2007a) and although this has improved in the fourth term, it remains the                
highest in the UK legislatures: during the fifth term there are 44 Members and 83 committee                
roles to fill (EPAER, 2017). Thus far, the capacity issue has been mitigated via institutional               
engineering: committees of variable size, streamlining the number of committees and their            
portfolios, more effective use of subcommittees and rapporteurs.  
 
Other measures of committee institutionalisation focus on their relationship with the rest of the              
Assembly and on their legislative autonomy. On both of these measures, the committees provide              
6 Committee on the Better Governance for Wales (2005-2007), the Shadow Commission (2006-2007), 
Committee on the Standing Orders (2005-2007), Committee on the Government for Wales Bill (2006) 
7 To reflect the overall party balance in the Assembly 
Page 22 
  
evidence of steady maturing and consolidation. Committee autonomy can be hindered by            
excessive party control over committee members and by attempts to minimise dissent -this             
possibly explaining the high turnover in committee membership in the first term. More specific              
to the Assembly was the executive dominance in the corporate body period due to ministerial               
membership in subject committees. For example, committees portfolio changes usually reflected           
reshuffles on the executive side (e.g. agriculture and rural development portfolio changed to             
environment, planning and countryside in the second term). Since 2007, when the Assembly             
started operating ​de facto ​as a parliament, committees can amend bills (at committee stage) and               
have legislative initiative, which they have used successfully on three occasions (Committee on             
Standards of Conduct with one legislative initiative in the third term and the Commission with               
two initiatives- admittedly, all on internal matters rather than wider public policy). The recasting              
of committee portfolios in the third and fourth terms suggests a more deliberate and planned               
attempt to naturally realign some policy priorities (e.g. children and young people with             
education; environment with sustainability etc). 
 
The transformation of the committee system at organisational and operational level reflects, to a              
great extent, the development of Welsh devolution. It maps all of its significant landmarks: the               
overly prescribed, limited and executive-driven corporate body, the complexity of the interim            
constitution which led to the more consolidated stage of primary powers, all underpinned by the               
struggle to balance the small size and capacity with an expanding portfolio of power and               
competencies. A significant finding here is the role of strategic management in mitigating, or              
addressing (when within its powers) the capacity issue of the Assembly, a leitmotif of Welsh               
devolution. Overall, the committees’ evolution has largely been from novelty, peculiarity, and            
experimentation to absorbing traditional and more widely established parliamentary norms and           
practices. 
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Conclusion 
 
This chronicling of the Assembly committees and their development underlines the consolidation            
of stable and predictable patterns of organisation, operation and responsiveness to change. Taken             
as a whole, we find that the committees encapsulate devolution’s most prominent rhetorical             
strand, that of closer engagement with citizens framed by a more open and accessible politics.               
This approach characterised the operation of the policy-oriented committees, via some           
interesting experimentation, in the first two Assemblies, but with little standardisation of            
consultative and engagement practices. As the Assembly matured, so public engagement became            
more entrenched at strategic level and functionally and organisationally differentiated via           
permanent structures such as the Petitions’ Committee or via the newly integrated committee             
support services. Our analysis has highlighted the strong correlation between devolution’s           
inclusive rhetoric and its transposition in organisational structures and processes.  
 
Secondly, we consider committees to be a useful device for understanding the wider change              
process, initially by innovative adaptation and reconfiguration of structures (institutional          
engineering), and later by becoming active and more autonomous deliberators and scrutinisers of             
wider constitutional shifts around them. As the Assembly acquired more traditional           
parliamentary structures such as the Commission and the Business Committee, constitutional           
considerations became more embedded at committee level and were given elevated attention            
through better scrutiny and oversight.  
 
The micro level of the Aston Matrix also helped map the extent to which the committees have                 
achieved stable patterns of organisation, membership, permanence and autonomy with respect to            
the rest of the Assembly. At this level, we found a higher degree of predictability throughout the                 
fourth Assembly, some radical changes in the committee system in the third term, and a               
relatively higher instability of the committee system in the first two Assemblies between 1999              
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and 2007. There was also a significant change in terms of the statutory framework regarding               
their organisation, ranging from highly prescribed to more flexible as the institution matured.             
The structural changes in the committees in the third and fourth Assemblies are indicative of               
their more strategic management by the Commission, a stronger focus on scrutiny, and a larger               
and institutionalised emphasis on public engagement. The establishment of the Assembly           
Commission ensured that strategic leadership was formalised, with a clear outline of the role that               
committees were expected to play within the broader institutional strategy.  
 
Overall, our analysis reveals a close relationship between the Assembly’s internal committee            
system and processes, and the wider strategic operating context. The committees have actively             
shaped the Assembly’s internal configuration and procedures, whilst also informing and           
contributing to broader constitutional debates, especially through driving greater public          
engagement.  
 
This article offers a different take on the typical journey of change and adaptation within a                
democratic institution. In focusing exclusively on committees in a new institution, a rarely used              
area of internal architecture for such research, it has ​​explored the process of institutional change.               
The paper’s contribution is twofold: first, by fusing management analysis and political theory in              
its conceptual approach, it has allowed for a different and more forensic analysis of the markers                
for change. Secondly, and uniquely we believe, it has focused upon changes in committee profile               
and identity, suggesting a role for them as significant reflectors of constitutional change. This              
hybrid theoretical framework offers insight into how a parliamentary organisation strategically           
manages and resources its deliberative practices, essential to positioning the institution within its             
wider polity. 
 
Whilst committees have been primarily evidenced as ​markers of change, our study also hints at a                
further perspective and a somewhat deeper level of analysis. It is too early to offer a conclusive                 
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verdict on the impact of committees as ​determinants ​of the change process as this will require                
further longitudinal and comparative studies. However, we can say that the development of             
ancillary studies of committees is a positive and complementary addition to the wider study of               
constitutional change, especially during periods of significant institutional flux. The Assembly           
committees have clearly reflected the pace and shape of changes in devolution, as well as               
reflecting ongoing constitutional debate on devolution itself.  
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